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a b s t r a c t 
Current authentication protocols seek to establish authenticated sessions over insecure channels while 
maintaining a small footprint considering the energy consumption and computational overheads. Tradi- 
tional authentication schemes must store a form of authentication data on the devices, putting this data 
at risk. Approaches based on purely public/private key infrastructure come with additional computation 
and maintenance costs. This work proposes a novel non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZKP) authentica- 
tion protocol that incorporates the limiting factors in IoT communication devices and sensors. Our pro- 
tocol considers the inherent network instability and replaces the ZKP NP-hard problem using the Merkle 
tree structure for the creation of the authentication challenge. A series of simulations evaluate the perfor- 
mance of NIZKP against traditional ZKP approaches based on graph isomorphism. A set of performance 
metrics has been used, namely the channel rounds for client authentication, effects of the authentication 
processes, and the protocol interactions to determine areas of improvements. The simulation results indi- 
cate empirical evidence for the suitability of our NIKP approach for authentication purposes in resource- 
constrained IoT environments. 
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm has become the driving 
factor for the exponential increase of inter-connected devices and 
sensors. These devices have gradually evolved from sensing the 
environment to data processing and decision-making. These en- 
abled better user experience, but also, an alarmingly increased at- 
tack surface against traditional confidentiality, integrity and avail- 
ability aspects [1] . The “things” are connected via wireless links 
to form complex and often pervasive Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSN) with suitable resources and interfaces to information that 
can be relayed back to source nodes. 
There is a variety of applications for IoT ranging from wearable 
computing, healthcare to supply chain monitoring and military 
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[2–7] . The necessity to authenticate entities (participants) and at- 
tribute associated actions in WSN is of paramount importance [8] . 
The communication in these networks often includes unauthenti- 
cated participants allowing threat actors to abuse network compo- 
nents in a variety of ways. This abuse is often manifested as tar- 
getted and multi-stage cyber attacks, passive or active eavesdrop- 
ping, Denial of Service (DoS) and the insertion of rogue sensors 
affecting the integrity and availability of data [9] . The increase in 
intra-sensor communication in WSN opens a new area of attacks, 
since a participant can aggregate modified messages from different 
participants within the network. Given that malicious nodes can 
access network resources arbitrarily, the security of these aggrega- 
tion processes that often include data processing is also essential 
for the efficacy and feasibility of these networks [10] . 
Due to the broadcast nature of WSN, different vector of attacks 
can be manifested at the network layer. A malicious node can se- 
lectively drop packets and actively or passively inspect traffic. The 
assumption is that often these nodes are considered trustworthy 
when they forward messages within the network [11,12] . Com- 
promised nodes can be used as sinkholes to concentrate network 
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Fig. 1. Attacks in WSN [11] . 
traffic and perform traffic analysis to identify communication pat- 
terns. In Sybil attacks, a malicious node can co-exist in multiple 
locations in an attempt to compromise fault-tolerant schemes af- 
fecting both data integrity and availability to legitimate resources 
[13] . In addition, malicious nodes can also record and re-play pack- 
ets in different locations within the target network. This type of 
attack known as wormhole, is particularly dangerous as it gives a 
false perception of proximity to legitimate nodes. It also prevents 
routing packets from being discovered [14] . Fig. 1 illustrates the 
main WSN attack categories in terms of their impact. 
Strict requirements prior IoT deployment such as aggregation 
processes and secure integration of services within the network 
should be considered [15] . In addition, the limited IoT object re- 
sources, namely, computation and processing must also be con- 
sidered when designing authentication protocols for IoT systems. 
Standards such as IEEE 802.14.4-2015 have been created for the 
physical and MAC layers to tackle some of these problems [16] . 
When examining the requirements for authentication protocols, 
the assumption is that semantic security is offered in WSN and the 
communication architecture within which the protocols will oper- 
ate is well established. 
The communication architecture is often described by criteria 
such as the key generation process, the number of participants 
using the protocol and the mechanisms used to derive session 
keys. However, where collaborative functions such as data aggrega- 
tion and node referrals require processing, this can directly contra- 
dict the security objectives even if the security requirements have 
been made explicit as part of the protocols’ specifications. When 
proposing security schemes for WSN, the challenge of maintaining 
the functionality and network efficiency dictates careful security 
design and implementation. This challenge increases in locations 
where network reliability is intermittent and where nodes are in 
locations where they could be physically compromised [17] . 
The development of a computationally sound NIZKP challenge 
value would allow the mitigation of certain threats against authen- 
tication assuming that each challenge value is encrypted. The Ver- 
ifier V must both be able to decrypt the challenge, proving that 
there is a shared secret key between the Prover P and V pre- 
venting impersonation attacks. Extending the security of the chal- 
lenge packet, the P could include their Universally Unique Iden- 
tifier (UUID) in the final packet encrypted with the server UUID 
provided in the initial client server exchange. In addition to con- 
fidentiality, should the server decrypt the final packet value, and 
this does not match the expected server UUID, the authentication 
challenge can be rejected. Using this extended functionality, from 
a NIZKP server a log can be generated to store three values, the 
client UUID, the server UUID and the public challenge for a ses- 
sion. A query of this log every time a client requests authenti- 
cation would check if the client UUID, server UUID or the public 
challenge had been used previously, either together or individu- 
ally. This simple log would provide a multitude of information that 
could be used in security operation monitoring, performance mon- 
itoring and auditing effort s [18–20] . An auditing function would be 
vital to monitoring and reporting on login frequency and malicious 
login attempts in otherwise unsupervised environments. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In 
Section 2 we discuss existing works in the field of ZKP with em- 
phasis upon authentication design principles of existing protocols. 
Section 3 focuses on the design and testing of our NIZKP pro- 
tocol with a detailed explanation of the authentication modules 
constituting the building blocks using a non-interactive approach. 
Section 4 presents the results and discussion from our experi- 
ments and the evaluation of NIZKP using formal statistical methods 
against the data produced by our simulations and existing ZKP ap- 
proaches. In Section 5 we present the threat model for our NIZKP 
protocol with a description of both threat vectors and mitigations. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes this work and gives future avenues. 
2. Related works 
In IoT systems the requirement for strong security procedures, 
especially application layer security, has led to the development of 
multiple authentication protocols, usually modelled on traditional 
authentication approaches. These schemes are often based on lo- 
gin credentials with stored authentication values or private/public 
key schemes. Attacks can originate from traditionally expected ad- 
versaries located inside or outside the network or from previously 
trusted nodes acting maliciously [21–23] . Recent advancements in 
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wearable wireless sensors with quality requirements namely, en- 
ergy, memory, and computational efficiency further incorporate 
ZKP to provide lightweight authentication with appropriate com- 
mitment schemes [24,25] . ZKP has also been used as a mean to 
implement web security models for information exchange over in- 
secure channels. 
The authors of Wong et al. [26] have introduced a robust 
authentication scheme over a secure communication channel in 
which the registration and login processes for entities is demon- 
strated. Registered entities can submit their queries to the network 
within a specific timeframe utterly independent of the application 
time and only while they move within a designated zone within 
this time. Should any of these requirements fail, the participant 
must re-register to the network through this scheme. The scheme 
is proved to be susceptible to impersonation, stolen V credentials 
and gateway bypass attacks. An enhanced version of this scheme 
was introduced in [27] that eliminates some of the attack vectors. 
This process has been achieved through changes in the authenti- 
cation steps to include separate phases during login and registra- 
tion and the addition of a password change capability. However, 
the enhanced version of the scheme was also found vulnerable to 
password guessing and impersonation attacks. 
The authors in [28] introduced a mutual authentication scheme 
with session key agreement between a user and an object. Tradi- 
tional password authentication has been used for the gateway ac- 
cess with a secret generated and stored on different devices within 
the system. These devices become designated to serve requests 
from the user. A smart card was also introduced during the login 
process to enable the device to calculate whether the request has 
been done within an acceptable timeframe for the session key to 
be created. Most of the techniques mentioned above rely on user- 
supplied information at the stage of transfering credentials that are 
stored to devices within the network. These limitations in existing 
authentication mechanisms can be partially addressed by the use 
of Zero-Knowledge proofs (ZKP). ZKPs are considered the corner- 
stone of modern cryptography on the premise that a proof can be 
both convincing and yet revealing no information other than the 
validity of the claim made. The conversation between the P and V 
must convince the latter about the Prove’s claim without the P re- 
vealing the details that construct the evidence. The exchange of in- 
formation must assure beyond any reasonable doubt the validity of 
P ′ s claim to V . Often this process is repetitive until the legitimacy 
of P ′ s is fully established. In each step, a reducing probability of 1 2 
n 
enables P to guess a response to the challenge presented by V . An 
inappropriate response to the challenge breaks the authentication 
process. There is no prior knowledge of the secret, nor changes are 
possible to publicly shared values without re-executing the com- 
mitment protocol. A variation of the ZKP is the Non-Interactive 
Zero knowledge Proof (NIZKP), in which there is no continuous in- 
teraction between V and the P as in the manner of the ZKP. The P 
still wishes to assure beyond doubt their claim of validity to the V , 
however, rather than reply in multiple interactive challenge rounds 
between the P and V , the ZKP proofs are computed and then dis- 
tributed by the P to the V . The V can then validate multiple claims 
without the need to reissue challenges thus reducing computation 
and communication overhead. In the case of bounded NIZKP the 
following applies: Given that a random string σ and a single suffi- 
cient theorem T , the algorithm outputs in a non-interactive manner 
a second string in zero-knowledge that T is true for any V who has 
access to the same string σ . The authors of Blum et al. [29] define 
the bounded NIZKP scheme as follows: 
Completeness: For all x ∈ L n and for sufficient large n , 
P r(σ
R ← − { 0 , 1 } n c ; P roof R ← − P rov er(σ, x ) 
: V er i f ier (σ, x, P roof ) = 1 > 2 / 3 (1) 
soundness: For all x ∈ L n for all turing machines Prover’, and for all 
sufficiently large n , 
P r(σ
R ← − { 0 , 1 } n c ; P roof R ← − P rov er ′ (σ, x ) 
: V er i f ier (σ, x, P roof ) = 1 < 2 / 3 (2) 
Zero-knowledge: An algorithm S such as x ∈ L n for all non- 
uniform algorithms D , for all d > 0, and all sufficiently large n , 
| P r(s R ← − V iew (n, x ) : D n (s ) = 1) 
− P r(s R ← − S(1 n , x ) : Dn (s ) − 1) | < n −d , (3) 
where, 
V iew (n, x ) = 
{ 
σ
R ← − { 0 , 1 } n c ; P roof R ← − P rov er(σ, x ) : (x, σ, P roof ) 
} 
(4) 
The authors of Feige et al. [30] have adopted ZKP for identity 
verification with emphasis on completeness where valid inputs can 
be proved on any protocol run and soundness where no malicious 
P or V can derive the secret from the interactions. 
Several authentication schemes seem to have incorporated ZKPs 
particularly within the context of Privacy Enhancement Technolo- 
gies (PET), electronic voting schemes, anonymous blacklisting sys- 
tems, and prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [31–34] . 
Common across all approaches is the obligation of each partici- 
pant to prove certain honesty in the execution of authentication 
processes. The ZKP in all cases plays a critical role in concealing 
the sensitive information within the network. The number of the 
required subsequent rounds of proof required and the associate 
cost of resources remains an issue in the construction of each ZKP. 
However, ZKP can be a perfect authentication candidate in cases 
that use of password-based approaches and PKI are either com- 
putationally expensive or impractical. Typical scenarios include au- 
thentication for the IoT with low or intermitted connectivity and 
strict energy preservation requirements related to the computa- 
tional complexity of security operations. 
The authors in [35] use a graph isomorphism-based scheme 
with a well defined ZKP problem where graphs are expected to 
grow in order to satisfy the security requirements. The authors in- 
troduced a variant of NIZKP using a single message to verify the 
knowledge. They also introduced the notion of different levels of 
security as a function of the number of challenges exchanged in- 
creasing the level of safety for the V . The use of the cryptographic 
cutting function has been used as a key requirement within the 
scheme to fulfil the computational assumptions about the crypto- 
graphic checksum needed. This scheme uses broadcast messages 
to identify legitimate network nodes and the commitment is de- 
crypted only if decryption of the previous submitted messages is 
successful. The results were emphasised in the polynomial ten- 
dancy between the size of the segments and the number of nodes 
of the graph that represents the network. The authors have also 
investigated the segment generation time with different devices as 
a function of the serialisation of graphs. As expected they reported 
high computational time to build the package although some cost 
was attributed to the programming language used for the imple- 
mentation. 
Merkle trees and predetermined timestamps have been used in 
a scheme introduced by Li et al. [36] . Many cryptographic schemes 
deploy Merkle trees that establish specific relationships between 
a tree leaf value and the root node value so as the authenticity 
of the latter can be established. Sibling leaves are combined and 
hashed to form a parent leaf repetitively. The traversal mechanism 
developed allows the values from all leaves to be stored outside 
the memory space which is regarded as a resource intensive and 
inefficient process [37] . 
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The problem of information leakage has been researched in 
peer-to-peer (P2P) authentication systems as a key component of 
the security resistance of identity-based approaches. The authors of 
Lu et al. [38] introduced a pseudo-trust scheme where ZKP is used 
for authentication using anonymous communications. The resis- 
tance of the scheme was tested against certain man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attacks using universal hashing and ZKP as an approach to 
bind pseudo-identities to the authentication paths. A similar ap- 
proach has been presented in [39] to address phishing and eaves- 
dropping in single-sign-on services (SSO) and transmission of user 
profiles across multiple platforms such as mobile phones and web 
applications. The potential to increase privacy and security using 
ZKP has been recently exploited in blockchain applications using 
a modified version of Di Crescenzo and Lipmaa’s protocol in [40] . 
The work reduces the size of both the proofs and the computa- 
tional complexity required for the verification process. Initial data 
can also be obtained by device fingerprinting and geo-fencing tech- 
niques that allow the verification to be completed prior to the cre- 
ation of the authentication challenge [41] . 
A common concern amongst the reviewed literature is the 
adaptation of ZKP protocols for the transmission of assets across 
a distributed P2P blockchain network. This area seems to attract 
much of the research efforts with focus on the privacy preserva- 
tion aspects of the communication [42,43] . The transaction verifi- 
cation is the only piece of information needed without exposing 
information about the sender, the recipient or assets. 
The demand for lightweight authentication schemes in the IoT 
domain and their importance has driven certain developments in 
the use of ZKP as a viable solution [44–46] . Finally, the authors in 
[47] define a web security model consists of multiple layers such 
as the interface, application, and database to execute control func- 
tionalities and optimise authentication and application versatility. 
3. NIZKP Design 
Our NIZKP protocol consists of two main authentication com- 
ponents, namely the client and server module described in 
Section 3.1 . During the communication initiation phase, the NIZKP 
client module sends to NIZKP server module the root node hash 
to be used as the public commitment for the challenge. The NIZKP 
client module then proceeds to decimate the Merkle tree, nodes 
not selected for use in the challenge which are no longer required 
are destroyed. The NIZKP client module examines the configuration 
for the minimum number of challenges required to build the chal- 
lenge packet (defined by configuration). The NIZKP client module 
then selects the initial candidate nodes for the challenge packet, 
starting at the appropriate level in the Merkle Tree. 1 For each can- 
didate selected, a secondary binary selection will determine if the 
candidate or both candidate’s child nodes will be selected for the 
packet. This recursive process will ensure that the NIZKP client 
module will always produce a challenge packet with the mini- 
mum required number of challenges but may also contain a ran- 
dom number of challenges between the minimum challenge value 
and the maximum node size for the tree. (e.g., Desired challenges 
= 32, Max Tree Nodes = 512, Challenge Packet Size = min32 → 
max512). 
Given the IoT object’s limited computational resources and po- 
tential for limited network connectivity, this research proposes an 
authentication protocol based on NIZKP. Where such proofs are 
utilised, the requirement to store authentication information, such 
as password hashes, is removed therefore to reduce the exposure 
to attack. NIZKP produces a commitment set of data and provides 
increased levels of flexibility for authentication in environments 
1 e.g., desired challenges = 32, Initial tree level = 32log 2 
without Internet connectivity that often prevents the use of exist- 
ing schemes based on certification authorities. 
The client authentication module produces graphs G 1 and G 2 
(See Fig. 2 ). Graph G 1 is generated automatically and G 2 is an iso- 
morphism of G 1. The permutation produced by G 2 constitutes our 
secret to be shared between the ZKP server and the V . A third 
party graph H will be generated as an isomorphism of G 1. G 1, G 2, 
H are shared between the client and ZKP server modules. The P 
between all graphs claims a shared isomorphism. Graphs from G 1, 
G 2 are randomly selected by the server and returned to the au- 
thentication client to enable isomorphism between each graph and 
H . When isomorphism is returned by the client in case that G 1 is 
selected the return is structured as π−1 : H → G 1 . The server’s per- 
mutation is used to confirm that H is indeed isomorphic to the V ’s 
chosen graph(s) and accepts the P ’s ( P ) claim. The probability of a 
single graph isomorphic to H is 50% for P including guessing the 
graph chosen by V . The V can increase confidence with a chal- 
lenge repeated until P ′ s legitimacy is established. Each repeated 
challenge reduces the probability of guessing the outcome as 1 2 
n 
(chosen graph) thus, increasing the legitimacy of the commitment 
to V . The authentication attempt is invalidated in cases that P fails 
to provide an appropriate solution. Once the commitment cycle is 
completed, both V is unaware of the secret, and P can not alter the 
publicly shared value for that run of the commitment protocol. 
The development and testing of our NIZKP adheres to cer- 
tain assumptions around its design. The nonces used are not pre- 
dictable thus replay attacks based on responses are not feasible. 
The trust relationships in the protocol design have been explic- 
itly defined with every message exchanges’ in the challenge pack- 
ets (See Fig. 3 ). During our protocol execution, it is easy to deduce 
to which run each message belongs into with clear conditions de- 
fined. The internal mechanics of the algorithm provide the condi- 
tions for messages to be acted upon. Although in this work the 
protocol does not dictate the encryption scheme to be used, the 
provision for it existing as part of our future work. The assumption 
is that our protocol supports widely acceptable standards such as 
iterative block ciphers for the formation and transmission of the 
encrypted challenge. 
3.1. NIZKP authentication modules 
The NIZKP client module P , generates a 256bit random number 
as the base data values for a Merkle tree to be build (See Fig. 3 ). 
SHA-256 is used for the leaf node creation LN X creation which in- 
cludes the checksum value of the lowest level of the Merkle tree 
with the total count calculated by node c ount = (LN ∗ 2) − 1 Under 
the operation of the NIZKP client module, a pair of sibling nodes 
are concatenated, and their resulting value is hashed. This value 
is the parent node value P N = H(SN n + SN n +1 ) with the two con- 
tributing nodes being its children. The process only stops when a 
final single value is calculated, namely the root node hash. The 
whole packet processing capability and simulation flow for our 
protocol are illustrated in Figs. 4 , 5 . 
The first communication step involves the root node hash value 
as public information for the creation of the challenge. The nodes 
that no longer needed in the challenge process are automatically 
discarded. The challenge packet is constructed using a minimum 
number of challenges and examined by the client using a configu- 
ration template. The client authentication module selects the can- 
didates for the challenge packet from an appropriate level in the 
Merkle tree. We define this tree level to 32log 2 with 32 required 
challenges. A separate algorithmic process decides on the selection 
of the candidates’ child nodes as part of the construction of the 
challenge packet. This step is to assure that the selection is always 
limited to input with enough entropy given the maximum node 
size of the tree. 
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Fig. 2. ZKP client server simulation flow. 
During the verification process, a solution to the commitment is 
requested by V and P supplies the values for the challenge packet 
previously computed from the Merkle tree in a specially crafted 
packet. The NIZKP commitment process is split into two phases 
including the actual commitment and verification involving both P 
and V sharing a universal root hash as calculated and shared by P . 
A selection of modes from the Merkle tree is sent from P to V for 
processing as part of the verification process. Successful verifica- 
tion of the root node hash by V renders the authentication attempt 
as successful. 
3.2. Simulation setup and datasets 
A series of simulations have been run following the princi- 
ples in [48] to construct the essential client/server communica- 
tions with all elements coded in Python using common design 
patterns. Traffic handling is achieved through Python sockets and 
the authentication modules of NIZKP have been implemented us- 
ing dedicated message blocks. These simulations have been used 
to collect primary data for each device utilising our protocol. Our 
simulations utilise a single threaded socket client/server for audit- 
ing and logging. Each authentication algorithm will be tested using 
the same device code for consistency across our experiments using 
common test harness during simulations. The appropriate authen- 
tication module code was looped to fulfil the required number of 
iterations during testing. 
The datasets created as part of our simulations consist of a 
combination of both ZKP and NIZKP with sample sizes of N = 
10 , 0 0 0 . We estimated 50 0 0 iterations for each pair to provide 
10,0 0 0 results. The tests were repeated for challenge requests of 
16, 32, 64, 128 and 256 against each proof creating a final dataset 
of N = 50 , 0 0 0 for each replicated test. We employ a positivist 
philosophy to eliminate self-developed constructs and measure 
only observable, repetitive and comparative dataset leading to re- 
producible scientific outputs. We also constructed a clear set of hy- 
potheses for testing, which is described in Section 4 . 
4. Results and discussion 
The data collected during our experiments is used for the eval- 
uation of the client authentication module. Client authentication 
will be tested against each algorithm using an increasing number 
of proof challenges, analogous to increasing confidence in the au- 
thentication. A Two way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with repli- 
cation is used to test the data and formulate three null hypotheses 
to be examined as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) . H0: The number of challenges do not have any 
significant effect on the response. Ha: Rejection of the First Null Hy- 
pothesis means the number of challenges is significant. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) . H0: The authentication proof algorithm does not 
have a significant effect on the response. Ha: Rejection of the Sec- 
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Fig. 3. Challenge packets and construction of proof. 
ond Null Hypothesis means the authentication proof algorithm factor 
is significant. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) . H0: The interaction between the challenges and 
authentication proof does not pose a significant effect on the response. 
Ha: Rejection of the Third Null Hypothesis means that an effect from 
the interaction of challenges and authentication proof algorithm fac- 
tors is significant. 
The choice of the client authentication time, from initiation of 
authentication request to receipt of successful authentication, has 
been selected to test the proposed theory. Using a NIZKP, will pre- 
clude other measurement metrics, e.g., NIZKP will always use less 
network traffic by design so this must be excluded, less traffic and 
associated overhead means measurement of traffic size must also 
be excluded. The outcome measurement will consider time as a 
dependant variable. This will not be a consideration for the de- 
termination of the result alone as multiple factors can influence 
running time and so is usually considered a poor metric to ob- 
serve, but rather as a ratio difference of performance between the 
two algorithms. Should the design of the experiment or simula- 
tions used to gather data be flawed, any analysis results based on 
that data set is of questionable quality. Data gathered during the 
simulations are used for statistical study using an Analysis of Vari- 
ance (ANOVA) statistical model. Any informed decisions based on 
this study are only as sound as the methods used to obtain the 
data. A longitudinal time horizon involving repeated observations 
of the same variables has been employed to provide large numbers 
of repeated samples from which to perform analysis and inform 
conclusions. The datasets are tested prior to the final analyses to 
ensure that the data gathered from the simulation is appropriate 
for factorial testing. 
The simulation experiments used in this study produced data 
sets derived by repeated measurement on the same set of subjects 
under differing conditions. Pairing occurs where subject groups are 
linked and values are related. The proof challenge number were 
Table 1 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity. 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
Chi-square (Observed value) 267.485 
Chi-square (Critical value) 16.919 
DF 9 
p -value (Two-tailed) < 0.0001 
alpha 0.05 
deliberately paired to match baseline characteristics providing ap- 
propriate data for two-way ANOVA testing. A confidence level of 
%95 has been used throughout our testing with any observed value 
during our p -value analysis below 0.005 rejecting our hypotheses. 
Alternatively, the null hypothesis is accepted given the observed 
factor has no effect on the result. The data has been tested against 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity to compare the correlation matrix to 
the identity matrix to avoid redundancy between variables. A fail- 
ure in the test should indicate a correlation matrix identical to 
an identity matrix. Since an alternative authentication protocol is 
proposed we only observe the results of the BTS with p ≤ .050. 
The testing hypothesis H 0: state the variance is identical or Ha : at 
least one of the variances is different from another. For Bartlett’s 
test, the computed p -value is lower than the significance level 
( α = 0 . 05 ), the risk to reject the null hypothesis H 0 while it is true 
is lower than 0.01% (See Table 1 ). 
We also measured the sampling accuracy on our simulation 
data using Kaiser-Mayer-Olking test (KMO). Compact correlation 
patterns are indicated by results close to 1 rendering the fac- 
tors distinct and reliable in our factor analysis. The results of the 
KMO test deemed as just acceptable if the result is > 0.5, aver- 
age 0.5 ∼ 0.7, good for 0.7 ∼ 0.8, and excellent for > 0.8. For each 
dataset paired KMO values were separated and results obtained 
with a range spread to indicate appropriateness. The data gath- 
ered was an excellent candidate for factorial testing (See Table 2 ). 
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Fig. 4. NIZKP packet processing. 
Fig. 5. NIZKP client server message exchange. 
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Table 2 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olking measure of sampling 
accuracy. 
KMO Measure of Samp. Accur. 
NI_ZKP_16 0.995 
ZKP_16 0.986 
NI_ZKP_32 0.994 
ZKP_32 0.933 
NI_ZKP_64 0.995 
ZKP_64 0.943 
NI_ZKP_128 0.995 
ZKP_128 0.979 
NI_ZKP_256 0.994 
ZKP_256 0.989 
KMO 0.977 
Table 3 
ANOVA test 1: significance of algorithm and challenges. 
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr( > F) 
Algorithm 1 0.8956 0.8956 1155.6 < 2e-16 ∗∗∗
Challenges 4 1.8327 0.4582 591.2 < 2e-16 ∗∗∗
Residuals 1494 1.1579 0.0008 
A two-way ANOVA allowed the examination of two factors in a 
single experiment where we facilitate repeated data collection. To 
ensure accurate and reproducible results we also considered the 
following factors: (1) The experiment consists of two participants 
(client, server) with standard data logging and collection methods. 
All modified authentication protocols have been included as part of 
the participants’ interaction during our simulations. (2) Each round 
of authentication is considered as a single test. (3) We performed 
tests in cycles of 10 0 0 and replicated five times for each configura- 
tion of authentication challenges. We used Measured System Anal- 
ysis (MSA) to measure the accuracy and precision in data collec- 
tion. MSA is used as mean to quantify the accuracy, precision and 
stability of an experimental design in terms of the data produced. 
This allows us to experimentally determine the amount of varia- 
tions existed within our measurement process and quantify vari- 
ability in our results during the hypotheses testing. MSA is effec- 
tive in our experiments to assure that data collected and analysed 
is appropriate for increasing the reliability during our testing and 
determine the likely source of variation in our data. 
The analysis on the homogeneity of variance in the group data 
was based on the hypothesis that (H0) there are differences be- 
tween variables and (Ha) there are no differences between vari- 
ables. The test against the collected dataset seeks to explore the 
significance of variance between the authentication algorithm and 
the number of challenges performed. 
Table 3 illustrates the statistical significance between the au- 
thentication algorithm and challenges. Further changes to either 
the algorithm or the challenges will have a significant impact on 
the time required to complete a single protocol run. The signifi- 
cance of the impact has been measured through the examination 
of the factors’ interaction and the results determine whether the 
null hypotheses H 0, Ha can be accepted or rejected as a function 
of the significance level of p (if p ≤ .50, H 0 should be rejected and 
Ha is accepted). 
Table 6 also shows a statistical significance between the inter- 
action of the factors algorithm and the challenges where the p - 
value (< 2 e − 16) of algorithm is significant indicates association 
between its selection and the authentication challenge’s duration. 
The p -value (< 2 e − 16) of challenge is significant indicates an as- 
sociative relationship between the number of challenges required 
and the duration of the authentication challenge. Finally, the p - 
value (< 2 e − 16) for the interaction between the two factors indi- 
cates a strong dependence of the duration of authentication chal- 
Table 4 
Tukey multiple pairwise-comparison. 
Difference Lower value Upper value p adj. 
x32-x16 0.004218603 0.002409931 0.006027276 0 
x64-x16 0.01725294 0.015444267 0.019061613 0 
x128-x16 0.043104083 0.041295411 0.044912756 0 
x256-x16 0.095028167 0.093219494 0.096836839 0 
x64-x32 0.013034337 0.011225664 0.014843009 0 
x128-x32 0.03888548 0.037076807 0.040694153 0 
x256-x32 0.090809563 0.089000891 0.092618236 0 
x128-x64 0.025851143 0.024042471 0.027659816 0 
x256-x64 0.077775227 0.075966554 0.079583899 0 
x256-x128 0.051924083 0.050115411 0.053732756 0 
Table 5 
Pairwise t -test. 
X16 X32 X64 X128 
X32 0.16 - - - 
X64 1.8e-08 2.0e-05 - - 
x128 < 2e-16 < 2e-16 < 2e-16 - 
X256 < 2e-16 < 2e-16 < 2e-16 < 2e-16 
Table 6 
ANOVA test 2: significance of interaction of auth. Algorithm and challenges. 
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr( > F) 
Algorithm 1 0.8956 0.8956 13614 < 2e-16 ∗∗∗
Challenges 4 1.8327 0.4582 6965 < 2e-16 ∗∗∗
Algorithm:Challenges 4 1.0598 0.2650 4028 < 2e-16 ∗∗∗
Residuals 1490 0.0980 0.0001 
Fig. 6. Residuals vs fitted plot. 
lenge and the relationship of algorithm and challenges. Significant 
p -value results also indicate differences between group means. 
This difference can be better understood by a multiple 
pairwise-comparison test (See Table 4 ). The adjusted p -values for 
each of the pairwise-comparison for the authentication challenges 
reported results of significance ( padj . < 0.5). Table 5 illustrates the 
significance in the combinations confirmed by a pairwise t -test fol- 
lowing correction for multiple testing. A normal distribution is as- 
sumed following the ANOVA tests carried out including the homo- 
geneity of variance ( Fig. 6 ). The Residuals vs Fitted plot is used to 
check for violations in our model assumptions, in particular, any 
occurrences of heteroscedasticity, non-linear relationships among 
the response variables and predictors, unequal error variances and 
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Fig. 7. Normal distribution plot. 
detected outliers. The Residuals versus Fitted plot shows no evi- 
dence of association between fitted values and residuals (detected 
outliers but fall within acceptable criteria), therefore homogeny of 
variances can be assumed. The results from the Bartlett’s test are 
consistent with this observation. The data presents a normal dis- 
tribution as reported by both ANOVA and Shapiro-Wilk test against 
ANOVA residuals ( W = 0.89995, p -value < 2 . 2 e − 16) . The ANOVA 
testing assumes variance is equal across samples and that sample 
data is normally distributed. If unequal group sizes are used dur- 
ing ANOVA testing, homogeneity of variance will be violated. Large 
sample variances when observed in small sample sizes can lead to 
underestimating the significance level and falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis. Conversely, where large variances are observed in large 
group sizes, the significance level may be overestimated, decreas- 
ing the validity of the tests performed. 
Fig. 7 illustrates the normality plot of residuals with data fol- 
lowing the reference line which shows that our sample data is 
valid. Based on this analysis of the collected data, the results and 
accuracy of the ANOVA testing, the hypotheses can be evaluated 
against these findings. 
4.1. Hypothesis testing 
We introduced multiple rounds of challenges in our simula- 
tions to probe on algorithm’s performance and the effect of the in- 
creased challenges to the its overall authentication overhead. Given 
that a V must be of the legitimacy of a P , we repeat the pro- 
tocol rounds to decrease the probability of guessing the answers 
to the V ’s challenges. Hypothesis 1 ( H 1) proves no significant ef- 
fect on the authentication times on the client device, as a func- 
tion of the increased challenges used in the authentication proto- 
col. The ANOVA test shown noticeable results for H 1 as challenges 
p -value is smaller than ( p ≤ .050) rendering the value insignificant 
(See Fig. 8 ). 
• Rejected - H0: There is no significant effect from the number of 
challenges factor on the response. 
• Accepted - Ha: Rejection of the First Null Hypothesis, the number 
of challenges is significant. 
For Hypothesis 2 ( H 2) we focused on the implementation of 
two different ZKP algorithms with multiple rounds of challenges 
used as a block to allow the V to build confidence in P ’s claim. The 
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
x16 x32 x64 x128 x256
Challenges
D
ur
at
io
n 
(m
s)
Algorithm
NI_ZKP
ZKP
Hypothesis 1
Challenges Performance
Fig. 8. Effect of authentication challenges. 
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Fig. 9. Effect of authentication algorithm. 
NIZKP focuses on the same operation where multiple proofs are 
created and processed in batches removing the necessity for a re- 
peated communication between the P and the V . All challenges are 
sent to the V using a single communication and the V accepts or 
rejects the proof after processing the message received. Hypothe- 
sis 2 H 0 predicts no significant effect from the authentication proof 
factor on the response indicating significance of the former. Also, 
results suggest that p -value is smaller than the significance level 
( p ≤ .050) as illustrated in Fig. 9 . 
• Rejected - H0: No significant effect from the authentication proof 
algorithm on the response. 
• Accepted - Ha: Rejection of the Second Null Hypothesis, the au- 
thentication proof algorithm factor is significant. 
Our simulations used both interactive and non-interactive 
methods for the authentication process with increased number of 
challenges. While both methods use ZKP actions to realise their op- 
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Fig. 10. Effect of interaction of algorithm and challenges. 
eration, the communication and interaction profiles between them 
are different. Their effectiveness is demonstrated through the mod- 
ification of challenges in each round of the authentication process 
for each method. Hypothesis 3 ( H 3), predicts that there is no sig- 
nificant effect from the interaction of challenges and authentica- 
tion proof algorithm factors on the response (See Fig. 10 . Again, a 
significant result is returned from the ANOVA test, the Algorithm 
p -value is again many times smaller than the level of significance 
( p ≤ .050). 
• Rejected - H0: There is no significant effect from the interaction 
of challenges and authentication proof algorithm factors on the re- 
sponse. 
• Accepted - Ha: Rejection of the Third Null Hypothesis means that 
effect from the interaction of challenges and authentication proof 
algorithm factors are significant. 
Throughout all the simulations and consecutive analyses, a sta- 
tistically significant difference has been identified between the au- 
thentication protocols and their interactions with increased num- 
ber of challenges. For each of our hypotheses the difference of α
0.5 and p -value resulted on accepting only the alternative hypothe- 
ses in each case. 
5. Threat model 
Our NIZKP protocol provides mitigation from existing threat 
vectors both in current proposal state and the features introduced 
in its future developments. We identify a class of attacks promi- 
nent to our case with an explanation on both the potential at- 
tack vectors and mitigations in place as part of NIZKP’s interac- 
tions. Authentication requests should not be routed through the 
IoT device, especially when the gateway acts as the registration 
authority for the network. If such routing is permitted getaway by- 
pass attacks might be possible. Since hash trees are used to con- 
struct the authentication chain, our protocol can form the basis 
for future meshed mutual authentication schemes in IoT networks. 
Threat mitigation on the client side against a stolen V attack has 
been mitigated in our scheme as there is no password transmit- 
ted. Therefore, password guessing is infeasible against NIZKP as the 
way our challenge is calculated renders this attack vector unusable. 
Although an adversary could sample the authentication chal- 
lenge for multiple client authentication requests against a uniquely 
identified UUID, there are no values stored at any stage in the au- 
thentication process [49] . In the scenario of node impersonation 
and replay attacks, an adversary may be able to impersonate a 
sensor node and by accessing secret values such as the temporal 
client UUID, he or she might be able to re-create the challenge. 
The proposed auditing and logging of authentication requests from 
a client against UUIDs and the published root node hash for each 
session, prevents an adversary from replaying the challenge or in- 
jecting a challenge packet based on rebuild sample values. When 
nodes, sensors are deployed in unattended environments, they be- 
come susceptible to node capture attacks. In a node capture at- 
tack, any sensor or entity with the network can act as an adver- 
sary whereby they can capture, re-program and re-deploy a node 
within the target network [50] . This attack can lead to significant 
security and privacy risks within the environment. Without proper 
network monitoring procedures in place, device absence as a re- 
sult of a physical capture can not be noticed [51,52] . This type of 
attacks can render further attacks such as Sybil and selective for- 
warding possible. 
In cases that the same hash function is used for both leaves 
and branch nodes in the Merkle tree structure it would be pos- 
sible to generate collisions or even second preimages with ar- 
bitrary values. If for example m is a message longer than the 
segment size of the hash tree, h internal be the internal hashing 
function and the leaf hash function h leaf , then the hashing value 
of m can be calculated as: h (m ) = h internal (h lea f (m 0 ) || h lea f (m 1 ) , 
where m 0 , m 1 are the different segments of m . If a m 
′ exist such 
that m ′ 	 = m and h (m ′ ) = h lea f (m ′ ) = h lea f (h lea f (m 0) || h lea f (m 1)) if 
h lea f = h internal then h (m ′ ) = h (m ) that can constitute a second 
preimage attack. 
Authors in [53] have introduced several preimage attacks 
against the dithered variants of the Merkle-Damgard mode of op- 
eration. Further attacks have been recorded in the literature with 
regards to the application of Merkle trees in several applications 
such as bitcoin and Blockchain networks [54] . Often, these appli- 
cations do not distinguish between inner nodes and leaf nodes, 
thus the length of the tree is often implicitly given by the num- 
ber of corresponding transactions inside the network. An exhaus- 
tive discussion on these attacks is outside the scope of our work. 
We have also identified that adversaries can extract configuration 
information and impersonate legitimate participants during the au- 
thentication process. All pre-cautions must be taken to ensure the 
configuration between the gateway and the sensor is encrypted, 
leading to an unforgeable Merkle tree generation. Mitigation of this 
risk has been considered in our future work where device specific 
fingerprinting is utilised in the provision of uniquely identifiable 
information as part of NIZKP’s operation. 
6. Conclusion and future work 
This work seeks to articulate the design, development and the 
preliminary quantitative study of a novel authentication protocol 
based on NIZKP. Our NIZKP protocol has been designed specifi- 
cally to offer performance and quality enhancements for the au- 
thentication challenges in resource constraint networks with clear 
identification of existing security threats. An experiment was de- 
signed to compare the performance of our protocol that utilises 
NIZKP based on Merkle trees against a traditional ZKP approach 
using graph isomorphism. We developed a set of statistical exper- 
iments to validate hypotheses based on key metrics on observa- 
tion data produced by our simulations. Throughout the analysis, 
we rejected all null hypotheses namely the number of authentica- 
tion challenges issued by the protocol and effects on performance, 
interactions and effects on performance, and protocols’ operation 
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and their effect on performance. We have identified that the con- 
struction of the Merkle Tree grants further investigation including 
the processing of the packet challenge, node recall and tree traver- 
sal as fundamental components in the creation of more resource- 
efficient algorithms. Also, although SHA256 has been used as the 
de-facto algorithm in our work, its effectiveness in resource con- 
traint environments must be examined further. Further improve- 
ments might be possible utilising hashes such as LOCHA. 
Although the hash values used in our challenge pack at time 
restricted, further evaluation is needed on the data protection pro- 
cesses introduced during the calculation of these hashes. Our sim- 
ulations use randomly generated data values to seed the nodes 
during the Merkle tree creation. We are currently seeking optimal 
solutions to obtain the seeding data for the data nodes in a cryp- 
tographically resistant manner while verifying the creation of the 
Merkle tree. 
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